Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

State of Utah In the Interest of Arthur J. Krums :
Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Glenn W. Adams; Attorneys for Respondnet
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, In Re: Krums, No. 10745 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3904

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

1-

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH IN THE
INTEREST OF
ARTHUR J. KRUMS

t

)

CASE NO. 10745

Respondent's Brief
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF THE
JUVENILE COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.
Honorable E. F. Ziegler, Juvenile Court Judge

C. DeMONT JUDD
Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah

Attorney for Appellani

GLENN W. ADAMS
512 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah

Attorney for Reapondent

FI L ED
Jtd\J 1 8 1967

-

---"i:!·:.~i::--s~~~;;~--c~~rl:~-iii~h----

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT
ANSWER TO
ANSWER TO
ANSWER TO

OF FACTS -----------------------------------------------------1
APPELLANT'S POINT I =-----------------------------6
APPELLANT'S POINT II =--------------------------.9
APPELLANT'S POINT III =----------------------11

RESPONDENT'S POINT I:
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
NOT BE DISTURBED. --------------------------------------------------12
RESPONDENT'S POINT II:
THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED
COUNSEL FEES AND COSTS OF APPEAL IN
CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL. -------------------.13
CONCLUSIONS ········-----····-··········-····-·-··········--·------·-·····-···--·---14
CASES CITED
Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P 214_______________ .}4
Hendricks vs. Hendricks, 91 Utah 564, 65 P 2d 642 ...........14
Johnson vs. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P 2d 16-------------7, 13
Sampsell vs. Holt, 202 P 2d 550, 115 Utah 73 ... -----------------7
Smith vs. Smith, 15 Utah 2d 36, 386, P 2d 900 ___________________7
STATUTES CITED
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated.. _______________________________ _.{), 7
Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated .................................. 6, 7
Section 55-10-77, Utah Code Annotated _________________________________ g
Section 55-10-77 2(b), Utah Code Annotated....-----------------··-8
Section 55-10-78, Utah Code Annotated........------------------------...9
Section 55-10-87, Utah Code Annotated... ------------------------------10
Section 55-10-96, Utah Code Annotated ... ·-··-·-·-···-····-------·······11
Juvenile Court Act of 1955, Beginning Section 55-10-63,
1965, Pocket Supplement of Utah Code Annotated........ 8

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STA TE OF UTAH IN THE

INTEREST OF

l
~

ARTHUR J. KRUMS

CASE NO. lC/745

MARIA MAGDELENE KRUMS,
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vs.

GOHANN J. ALFRED KRUMS,
Defendant in District Court
Divorce Action, Appellant.

Respondent's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The mother and father of the above named child were
plaintiff and dPfendant respectively in a divorce action
filed in thP District Court for \Veber County in October,
l9G2, file number 39845. Plaintiff sought custody of the
only issue of tlw marriage, the above named child born
,Ju]y l 8, 1956. An order to show cause was issued and
aftt>r hearing, an order dated October 9, 1962 was entered
awarding cUJstody of said child to the mother. The order
made after hearing contained the following language.
Paragraph 3 :

''That said parties be referred to the Juvenile
Court for the purpose of having the same make an
investigation of the welfare of said issue and that
said parties abide by any order or directive of the
Juvenile Court. That said referral be made within two days of this order."
There appears to be no record of any investigation made
by the Juvenile Court at that time.
On April 1, 1963, the father made an affidavit claiming neglect of said child and an order to show cause issued
requiring the appearance of the mother on the 8th of
April, 1963. A minute entry made April 15, 1963, indirates a hearing was had on the order to show cause and
the Court "orders the rhild transferred to the father during the day and transferred to the mother during the
weekend."
Trial of the divorce action was had on May 17, 1963,
with the mother being awarded the divorce and custody
of said child with visitation rights in the defendant. Said
decree was signed the 17th day of July, 1963.
In November of 1963 the father filed his petition to
modify the decree awarding him custody of said child and
for the issuance of an order to show cause. Hearing was
had on that petition on the 9th of December, 1963, in the
District Court with the Court's order entered thereon pre>viding in part as follows:
''The Court further admonishes the parties hereto
that the Court will not consider a change of
custody of said child until the child is 10 years
of age· unless there is a serious breach of conduct
or change of circumstances."
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Paragraph 2 :
''The Court hereby orders that there will be no
change of custody of Arthur Krums or any modification of the decree herein."
The appellant filed a second petition to modify the custody provisions of the divorce decree on the 17th of May,
1966 pointing out that said child would be 10 years of age
on .July 18, 1966. At a hearing held on the 23rd of May,
1966, the Court granted the request of the respondent to
take said minor child to Germany for a visit and further
ordered "the Court will not consider change of custody
at this time." Said order was signed the 25th of May,
1966.

By the affidavits of the respondent, the minor child,
ancl the appellant, said minor child ran away from the
n~spondent to Ogden Canyon along a mountain road and
finally to the home of the appellant. Th(~ appellant kept
the child from school and from the respondent, prompting
the District Court .Judge to issue to law enforcement offieers a pick up order for said child.
On the 2Gth day of 1fay, 1966, a petition was filed
by the father seeking temporary custody of said child.
Hearing on this petition was heard on the 6th day of
June, 1966, with the Court minute entry thereon reading
as follows:
"The Court awards the Juvenile Court custody of
the minor child and they are to make such orders
as they see fit."
Counsel's written order covering the hearing on June
fi, 196fi, was signed by the District Judge ·wahlquist on
thE:" 14th day of October, 1966. The findings of fact
entered found said child is:

"probably an early psychopath with a total disrespect for the truth.
2. That the Defendant instilled in his child a fear
of the Country of Germany, and that the child mav
never return therefrom, and poisoned the mind df
the child on the issue of custody, which was forbidden under the Divorce Decree.
3. That the defendant has secreted his son
Arthur Krums, in violation of this Court's order'
and has done so since l\fay 23rd, 1966.
4. That there were allegations on the part of the
child of physical cruelty by the mother. That
the Court finds no independent evidenee thereof,
and specifically makes no Finding of Fact or
Conclusion of Law.",
and concluded as follows :
"l. That the Petition for Temporary Custody iR
hereby referred to the .Juvenile Court for further
investigation and a determination, under the Utah
Code Annotated section 55-10-78 that the bailiff is
to take immediate custody of said minor child and
transport same to the Juvenile Court.
2. That the Defendant poisoned the mind of the
minor child and instilled a fear of the Country of
Germany, and a subsequent return therefrom, and
is forthwith held in contempt.
3. That the Defendant hai; secreted the whereabouts of Arthur Krums, since the day of May
23rd, 1966, and is forthwith held in contempt of
court."
Hearings were had in the Juvenile Court of the
First Distriet in and for Weber County, Utah, on the
father's petition for temporary custody of said child on
the 5th day o.f July, 1966, but were recessed to the 16th
day of August, 1966, to permit the parents and child to
1
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get a psychological evaluation.
On July 18, 1966 between the July 5 and 16th hearing before the Juvenile Court, said child had attained 10
years of age. He told the probation officer, Mrs. Dale,
that he wanted to go with his father, T-6.
The findings of fact made by the Juvenile Court
recite that said child:
''is bordering on an emotional breakdown.
2. Said Arthur Krums does not feel secure with
either parent.
3. Said Arthur Krums is developing no emotional attaehments."
and refers to the emotional problems of the parents.
The Com·t's order entered thereon, ordered:
''the care, custody, and control of said Arthur
Krums be with and the same is hereby awarded
to the natural mother, Maria Magdelene Krums,
subject to the protective supervision of the Department of Public vVelfare.
It is further ordered that the natural father's
visitation rights be limited to every other weekend, provided, however, if the father can show it
would be in the interests of said Arthur Krums
that his visitation rights be increased, the Department of Public Welfare can relax and increase said
visitation rights."
Said order further provided that the matter be continued
until the 27th day of February, 1967, at 2 :00 p.m.
The custody award made by the Juvenile Court after
]waring on said petition is the matter of appeal to this
Court.
5

ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT I
Appellant's Point I is the claimed error of the Court
in failing to give consideration and weight to the child's
preference.
A search of the transcript and the findings of fact
made, fails to reveal that the Court at any plooe indicated
that the child's expressed preference was not to be given
any weight or consideration. At T-9, the Court questioned
the conclusion of the probation officer, Mrs. Dale, favoring custody with the mother in view of the child's choice
to be with his father. The father's counsel advised the
Court at T-17 of the boy's preference and of this Court's
ruling in the Smith case. At T-26, Mrs. Dale indicated
that the boy is 10 years of age and desired to be with his
father. At 'T-35, the Court asked the question, "He has
indicated, at least on two occasions that he would rather
live with his father '1' From this question and other
testimony indicated, it is evident that the Court was
aware that it was the boy's preference to be with his
father.
Lacking comment from the Court, one can only
speculate what weight was given to this expressed preference. To conclude that the Court failed to give consideration and weight to this preference when fully aware of it
would appear to be without merit.
Appellant's Point l may claim that the J uvenill'
Court was bound under Sections 30-3-5 and 10, and the
Smith case, to make the child's election determinative on
the issue of custody.
6

Section 30-3-10 has been held to apply only to cases
of separation and not cases of divorce. See Sampsell vs.
Holt, 202 P 2d 550, 115 Utah 73, Johnson vs. Johnson,
7 Utah 2d 263, 323P.2d16.
Respondent finds no fault with appellant's reference
to Wallick vs. Vance and as set out in Johnson vs. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323P2nd18 agrees that the expressed
preference should be given weight and consideration as
one of the faetors in determining custody.
Appellant cites Smith vs. Smith, 15 Utah 2d 36, 386
P 2d 900 and the interpretation made in that case of sec~
tion 30-3-5 UCA as being in point in the present appeal
The Smith case holds that at the time a divorce decree is being entered and questions of custody being determined it is mandatory that the Court P.ward the custody of children who have attained the age of 10 years to
the parent of their expressed preference without regard
to general welfare considerations.
The Smith case is not authority for the proposition
that the District Court, in a custody hearing subsequent
to the entry of the divorce decree, must award custody
of a child having attained the age of 10 years according
to his expressed preference regardless of general welfare eonsiderations. Attention is directed to the last
sentenee of sPCtion 30-3-5 where the words "reasonable
and proper,'' are used in referenee to imbsequent changes
or new orders.
The Smith eases does not hold that the Juvenile
Court, hearing a eustody award case of an emotionally
disturbed run away 10-year-old child, subsequent to the
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entry of the divorce decree, is under mandate to, independent of welfare considerations, award custody according to a child's expressed preference.
The findings of fact of the Juvenile Court in this
case indicate this is a child whose "condition is such as to
endanger his own welfare" as provided in section 55-1077 (2b & 2c) and also one where jurisdiction is given
under 55-10-7'7 section 4 and is thus a child whose custody
should be determined by tlw provisions of the .Juvenile
Comt act of 1965.
lt is noteworthy that an unusual problem appeared
to exist in the child's welfare hy the orders made hy thr
District Court. For example, the Court's referral to thr
Juvenile Court at the time of the initial order to show
cause hearing and the orders made December 9, 1963 directing that the Court will not consider a custody change
or modification of the decree as to the custody and a
similar order made on the 23rd of May, 1966.

The action of the appellant in hiding the child, the
poisoning the mind of the child, in insisting on damning
the mother, in refusing to take the the psychological test
recommended by the 'Court may have brought the Court
to the conlusion that the father was unfit to have the
child's custody and even under the Smith case, not entitled
to the 10 year old child's custody.
A review of the provisions of the ,Juvenile Court act
of 1965 wherein provision is made for a Juvenile Court
Commission, advisory committees, an investigative staff,
social studies, medical and psychiatric examination indicate a legislative intent to have r·nstody questions deter-
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mined by the Juvenile Court. The provisions of 55-10-78
providing that the District Court may at any time decline
to pass on a question of custody and certify that question to the Juvenile Court together with a concurrent
jmisdiction with the District are indicative of this legislative intent.
The Juvenile Court act of 1965 was enacted subsequent to the decision in the Smith case and at no place
in that act is there any expression that the Juvenile Court
in any custody matter, regardless of the origin of its
jurisdiction, was bound by expressed preference over
welfare considerations in determining the question of
rustody.
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT II
In this point the appellant complains of a denial of
the right o.f cross Pxamination of witnesses and denial
of access to the psychologist's report.
The Juvenile Court in the July 5 hearing suggested
that both parents and the boy get a psychological evaluation and recessed further hearing on the case until
August 16 to permit this to be done. When the hearing
of August 16 began, the boy and mother had obtained a
psychological evaluation which was apparently in the
Court's possession. The fath er did not get a psychological
evaluation as suggested by the Court.
It is apparent from reading T-23 and 24 that both.
the apellant and the Court desired the presence of the
examining psychologist. Appellant's counsel said, ''I
would like, your Honor, to have the opportunity of
examining the psychologist. I haven't seen his report and
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nothing at all of his findings." The Court at 'T-23: ''Mrs.
Dale, I'm curious. Why isn't the psychologist going to
be here?" After commen ts from opposing counse1; "It
wasn't our understanding that the docitor had to be here,
your Honor." The Court observed: "This is true, but the
Court may have some questions of whoever is making.
. . ." Again at the top of T-24, the Court notes'' ... , but
a recommendation in this matter would probably be presented formerly (formally?) to the Court to give an opportunity for the Court to make further inquiry and also
Counsel can clarify the diffieulties that it may have in
understanding why the recommendation was made.'' Only
when Mrs. Dale indictaed that her eonclusion was ind('pendent of the psychologieal test did the Court permit hPr
to give her conclnsion8.
Counsel did not ask for a recess or n continuance to
secure the presence of the psychologist nor a subpot>na
to produce him. Section 55-10-87 subparagraph 6 provides that a parent or guardian shall he entitled to the
issuance of compulsory proeess for the attendance of witnesses on his own behalf or on behalf of the child. The
CoUJrt's inquiry as to why the psychologist was not present suggests that such a request would have been granted.
AppeUant's counsel appears to have cross examined
all of the witnesses who were called.
While it appears that the psychologi,cal evaluations
had some importance as suggested by counsel in page 8
of his brief, at no place in the transcript does tlwre appear a demand for a eopy nor any objection to the Court
receiving and consid1>ring the psychological evaluations
made of the mother and tht> child.
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8ection 55-10-96 provides for the use of written
reports and other material relating to the child's mental,
physical, and social history and condition, but provides
that the Court may require the person supplying the
report to appear as a witness.
Respondent agrees as contended by the appellant
that the right of cross examination of witnesses should
be preserved but cannot agree that such right was denied
the appellant when he made no request of the Court for
an opportunity to produce the psychologist nor demanded
a ropy of the psychologist's reports on the mother and
rhild . Nor does it appear that he can complain of the
''disadvantaged" position in which he found himself before the Court as to the psychologist's evaluations when
he refused to have such evaluation for the assistance of
the Court.

ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT III
Appellant complains that the Court erred in relying
upon the recommendations of Mrs. Dale and Miss Bevan.
A sear,ch of the transcript and findings of fact failed to
reveal what reliance the Court placed upon their testi~
mony. It ma.y be the Court did not find theeonclusions
they made any more valid than the appellant believes
them to be.
The Court at T-51 and 52 comments on the evidence,
and does not indicate that he relied upon the testimony of
either Mrs. Dale or Miss Bevan. At T-52 the Court does
note:
"The Court is faced with this proposition. The
Court knows quite a bit about the mother, but
11

nothing about the father except what I have been
able to observe on the witness stand. So based on
the information that has been presented to the
Court, the Court is going to award custody of the
child to the mother."
There being no evidence as to the reliance, if any,
the Court placed upon the recommendations, the respondent urges that this point is without merit. What is evident is that the Court in lacking the psychological evaluation suggested by the Court, of the father, knew, ''nothing about the father" and acted on the information presented to the Court.
RESPONDENT'S POINT I
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
NOT BE DISTURBED.
Hearings concerning the custody of this child were
before the District Court on the following occasions:
October 1962, when custody was awarded to the
mother after hearing on a preliminary order to show
ramie.
April 1963, after which custody was awarded to the
father during the day time and to the motlwr during
the weekend.
May 1963, on trial of the divorce action after which
custody was awardt>d to the plaintiff.
December 1963, on father's petition to modify with
custody continued in the mother.
May 1966, the father's third effort to obtain custody
with the District Court certifying the case to the
Juvenile Court.
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Hearings before the ,Juvenile Court were had:
It is to be noted that in every instance custody has
heen awarded to the mother except for the period between
April 15, 1963 and May 17, 1963 when that father had the
child during the day and the mother during the weekend,
and except for that period the father secreted the child
between May 23 and June 6, 1966.

This Court has repeatedly said these proceedings
are equitable in nature and said in J olmson vs. Johnson,
7 Utah 2d 263 323P2d19:
"Due to the equitable nature of such proceedings,
the proper adjudication of which is highly dependent upon personal equations which the trial Court
is in an advantaged position to appraise, he is
allowed considerable latitude of discretion and his
orders will not be disturbed unless it appears that
there has been a plain abuse thereof."
The District Court had four hearings and the .Juvenile Court two hearings in which to observe the parents,
their motivation, sincerity, and c.andor.
The repeated opportunities extended to the District
Court to consider the ''personal equations'' together with
the lack of any showing of abuse of discretion should
persuade this Court not to disturb the orders regarding
custody heretofore entered.

RESPONDENT'S POINT II
THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED
COUNSEL FEES AND COSTS OF APPEAL IN CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL.
The Appellant, from his answer and comiter-claim
rhallenging the mother's fitness to have custody of the
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child in question, has initiated three proceedings to
change the custody awards and has taken the present
appeal. This continued harrassment of the respondent
has subjected her to continuous expense.
Allowance of such fees is proper. See Dahlberg vs.
Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P 214 and Hendricks vs.
Hendricks, 91 Utah 564, 65 P 2d 642.
CONCLUSIONS
Respondent urges that the appeal of the appellant.
father be dismissed and that the award of custody made
by the Juvenile Court be upheld.
The Co·urt may and should award respondent counsel
fees and appeal costs.
Respectfully submitted,
GLENN W. ADAMS
Attorney for Respondent
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